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from the International Journal of Ethics, April, 1937.) Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1937. Pp. 19.
Reviewed by Cecil H. Driver
WHEN THEIRE comes to be published that great dissertation, The History
of Yale Dinner-Table Conversation during the Roosevelt Rcgimes, tindoubt-
edly we shall find several chapters devoted to a consideration of President
Hutchins' Storrs Lectures and the replies they have evoked. "What do you
think of the scheme?" "Did you read John Dewey's review ?", and so on. It
was all great fun, and both in duration and intensity it was better sport than
speculating about the new university President or the election. For most
assuredly Dr. Hutchins, with deadly aim, threw a nice little hand grenade
into the quiet groves of Parnassus. And now Dean Clark. mindful of the
uproar, has considerately provided us with cotton so that we may stop our
ears in case there are other detonations to follow.
Let us for the sake of clarity, however, make a distinction at the outset
between the negative and the positive sides of President Hutchins' bo.,k: be-
tween, that is to say, his indictment of existing universities and his con-
structive proposals. The detailed elaboration of his charges that the American
universities suffer from two grave defects-love of money, and anti-intellec-
tualism-has received remarkable endorsement from the most diverse quar-
ters. "He is right on both counts," says Henry Seidel Canby. "To most of
these charges we are so sensitive that listening to the recital of our short-
comings gives us a penitential pleasure," says Dr. Charner Perry of Chicago.
"I, too, am distressed by the evil results in American Universities of the love
of money, of lack of definite purpose, of a growing anti-intellectualism,"
echoes Dean Clark. And so the chorus swells. But when these readers pass
on to the constructive proposals in the book, the cheers of approval die away
and the mutters of protest begin to grow into a pretty noisy roar.
The gist of these proposals is simple enough. First, a new educational
stage lasting four years is to be intercalated between high-school and uni-
versity, covering what is now divided between the last two years of the one
1. President, University of Chicago.
2. Dean and Sterling Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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and the first two years of the other. The suggested curriculum, it is main-
tained, being based on four fundamental disciplines, will satisfy "all the needs
of general education in America," since it will provide a basic training in the
elements of reasoning, reflection and imaginative awareness. For the major-
ity of citizens this will be sufficient. Moreover, it will provide a firm founda-
tion for the minority capable of profiting from a university education.
Secondly, coherence is to be introduced into the university curriculum by
reorganizing it into three major fields, metaphysics, the social sciences, and
the natural sciences. Every student will specialize in one field while taking
the required minimum of subsidiary studies in the other two throughout his
college career. Research work will be excluded from the university. Thus,
it is hoped, a "principle of unity" will replace the purposeless anarchy of un-
related courses, and a philosophical spirit of relatedness and reflection will be
infused into all fields, so that the university may indeed become again a home
of thought And the hope may be entertained not only that the specialist will
have a due sense of his place in the context of the cultural heritage, but also
that he will be aware of the nature of his own implicit assumptions and their
relation to the assumptions of other specialists.
Now. unlike Dean Clark, I find myself in hearty sympathy with the general
end which President Hutchins has in view. If it is true, as he says, that voza-
tionalism is corrupting American university life from within, it is no less
true that a similar phenomenon can be observed in England, and that increas-
ing specialization is destroying in British universities any claim they may
once have had to providing a general culture or a wide critical outlook. The
underlying cause in both cases is the same, namely, the absence of any inte-
grated purpose in the university as a whole, and hence an easy acquiescence
in a general policy of laissez-faire. But laissez-faire in education, no less
than in economic life, destroys itself by the consequences of its own inner
dialectic. We are beginning to realize this truth in the one field; President
Hutchins is animated with a vivid sense of its relevance in the other; hence
his book is both an indictment and a program. Moreover, in education, as in
economic life, the gage thrown down against the spirit of laissez-faire is
certain to be picked up by the vested interests. The outcry against President
Hutchins' book is proof enough, if proof is needed.
But we must guard ourselves against two recurrent fallacies. On the one
hand, the acknowledgment of an indictment involves us in no obligation to
accept the first proffered remedy. On the other hand, we must save ourselves
from the fatal facility of the false antithesis. In the name of the first prin-
ciple I find myself unable to accept the details of President Hutchins' pro-
gram. In the name of the other I cannot accept Dean Clark's implications
that a coherent university purpose involves the tragic consequences now to be
found in Nazi Heidelburg. This kind of argument seems to me to be on a
par with that adumbrated in a famous speech last autumn to showv that the
New Deal legislation meant "treading the Moscow road."
President Hutchins pleads for a planned education with the same enthu-
siasm and sincerity that many of our contemporaries show in pleading for
a planned economy. And Dean Clark puffs his ruminative pipe over this
article in reply-for all the world like a sort of intellectual Stanley Baldwin,
cautious, canny, and common sense, conceding here a point and there a point,
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but very suspicious of the underlying contention. So I find myself in the
unfortunate position of being in partial agreement and partial disagreement
with each in turn.
Dean Clark admits the evils that Dr. Hutchins points out, but he makes
no positive contribution of his own towards their solution. He is rather
concerned, like Burke, to preserve the good we have than to risk the good
we wot not of. So he mainly occupies himself with showing the dangers of
the proposed alternatives. Most of his points carry conviction, though to one
reader, at least, his criticisms of the reformed liberal arts college seem uncon-
vincing and unrealistic, particularly in view of his own admissions. On the
other hand President Hutchins' arguments under this head seem extremely
cogent as applied both to American education and to English.
Nevertheless, while I want a university to be what President Hutchins
wants it to be, I do not believe his plan will help us very much-at least, in
the form in which he presents it. Indeed, I must confess that I do not really
understand what his plan is, except in the most general sense. Apparently
it is all derived from the basic postulate that metaphysics must integrate
the subsidiary university purposes. But how are we to determine which
metaphysic or whose, since there is no one metaphysic? If every shade of
the philosophic spectrum between Haeckel and Hegel is to be represented on
the campus, I cannot see that our university will be much more coherent
than it is now. Moreover, the problem of shifting emphasis, of changes
within the metaphysic, is left untouched. Even graver is the question, What
is to prevent the field of philosophy itself from becoming specialized and
departmentalized? It is the old issue: Quis custodiet custodcs? I cannot
help thinking that in his justifiable revolt against the multiplicity of electives
President Hutchins confuses the objective unity of the curriculum with that
far subtler problem of the subjective integration of personality and intellect
which the university' should foster. And that brings us straight to the ques-
tion of examinations.
Nothing adequate is said about the nature of the final examinations. This
is not a mere administrative detail, as President Hutchins seems to imply.
For the examination system is everywhere the rudder of educational policy,
and real educational reform can only begin where the educational process
ends, namely in the examination room. The retroactive implications of any
examination system are overwhelming. Apart altogether from the question
of topics, of teachers and taught, it will be found for instance that the Ox-
ford "Greats" system will produce one type of man and Yale's course system
quite another. I cannot but believe that a fuller elucidation of this problem
might reconcile much of the apparent disagreement between President Hutch-
ins and Dean Clark, or at least prepare the way for such a reconciliation.
After nine years as an examiner for English state scholarships, I am per-
suaded that the questions of curriculum, of purpose, and of social implication,
focus just at this point. The influence, for example, of an independent exam-
ination, conducted by external examiners and based upon a defined and pub-
lished syllabus drawn up by an independent board of studies, would be
conspicuous throughout the entire educational pyramid. In the case of Eng-
land, it has revolutionized secondary education since the war, though the
fact does not appear to have got into the text books. For if the State Scholar-
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ship Boards determine on the one side the quality of the student entering the
university, on the other side they determine both the quality and the content
of educational aspiration within the secondary schools; and these in their
turn, by their entrance and scholarship examinations, similarly influence
the elementary schools below them. The same general comments would apply,
-nutatis vtutandis, to university examination structures.
It is for these reasons that my own positive suggestinns, were they of any
relevance, would center around this question of the reform of what may be
called the constitutional structure of the examination system involved. For I
believe that such a reform is attainable. But it would carry with it a unity
quite other than the unity of metaphysical postulates. That is where I dis-
agree with both President Hutchins and Dean Clark. The one hopes, and
the other fears, that broad unity of purpose within the university can only
be secured when there is an underlying unity of metaphysic. I cannot accept
this contention for I believe both positions depend upon the same kind of
fallacy that is involved in the Hegelian interpretation of the State. In other
words, constitutional unity is quite other than metaphysical unity; and, as
L. T. Hobhouse long ago showed us, a structural purposiveness is far from
being the same thing as the homogeneous identity of individual wills.
This line of thought would, too, I believe, give us a point of departure for
considering the complicated and vexed problem of specialization and voca-
tionalism-a problem which President Hutchins seems unduly to simplify
and Dean Clark unvisely to ignore. It is certainly a serious enough problem
for all the democracies. Yet we can, at least, get the statement of it clear.
For the problem of *ocationalism is the problem of superimposing a particu-
lar competence upon that generalizcd awareness we call culture. The pre-
liminary question then becomes: How wide do we want that awareness to
be, and how sensitive? The constitution of our examination structure pro-
vides the framework within which conflicting forces making for diverse
answers will operate. I no more believe that a coherent examination'structure
will give us an absolute answer to these questions than I believe that a co-
herent political constitution gives us an absolute answer to the problems of
democracy. In each case the structure but provides the means for the con-
tinuous integration of competing intentions into emergent purposes. But in
each case the structure is primary and essential if anarchy is to be avoided.
Yet neither of the two writers we are considering touches on these matters.
Space does not allow of a full consideration of other features in President
Hutchins' book. Yet one extraordinary blind spot must certainly be men-
tioned. President Hutchins' main plea is for an underlying metaphysical
unity in the educational system. What he seems to be unaware of, is that
such a unity exists in the United States today. Nothing strikes a foreigner
more forcibly on getting acquainted with the educational structure than the
amazing uniformity of presupposition and principles in the whole of Ameri-
can educational life. From California to Connecticut the shadow of John
Dewey lies dark over the continent, and it will certainly not be removed in
our lifetime. Not only can no comparable phenomenon be found in any
other democracy today, but I am prepared to argue the case that the alleged
"unity" of medieval universities provides nothing comparable either in the
thirteenth or any subsequent century. So it would seem that what President
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Hutchins wants is not so much a unifying metaphysic as a different meta-
physic.
Perhaps it is President Hutchins' misreading of history which is account-
able for the invalidity of his argument about metaphysics; for when he devi-
ates into historical innuendoes his assertions become startling. Take one
example: "Greek thought was unified; it was unified by the study of first
principles." When did this miracle occur? What is the principle of "unity"
to be found between the thought of Parmenides, of Heraclitus, and of Empe-
docles? Were Socrates and the traditional Sophists in such fundamental
unity that they can give us a model for today? Does the whole episode of
the execution of Socrates suggest a very marked degree of unity on first
principles? Or is the opening book of the Republic redolent of unity? And
can it really be said that the Cynics and Cyrenaics, the followers of Zeno
and those of Epicurus, derived their philosophies from a world-view more
"unified" than that which binds together the reflections, say, of T. V. Smith,
W. E. Hocking, Samuel Alexander and Henri Bergson?
Or consider President Hutchins' other assertion that "the medieval uni-
versity had a principle of unity . . . it was an orderly procession from truth
to truth." When and where could this state of affairs be found? Can even
the Chicago philosophy department discover the higher synthesis of nominal-
ism, realism, and conceptualism? And even though the acknowledgment
of certain fundamental dogmas of the Church was necessary, this platitude
cannot be stretched to cover the assertion that there was a principle of unity
animating the universities. Even at the height of his renown St. Thomas
found some of his basic postulates not merely criticised but fiercely attacked.
The reading of these disputations suggests less unity at Paris and Oxford,
even among his brother Dominicans, than is to be found between President
Hutchins and Dean Clark. Did not John Peckham claim that Aquinas was
eventually compelled to submit some of his major theses humbly to the cen-
sorship of the Paris faculty, "donec ipse omnes positiones suas quibus posset
imminere correcto, sicut doctor humilis subjecit inoderamini Parisienshim
majistrorun'? And what about the famous condemnation of the 219 propo-
sitions by the Paris Masters of Theology on March 7, 1270, or the similar
condemnation at Oxford eleven days later? But perhaps this "unity" was not
to be found until the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries ? In which case We are
left with the pleasant occupation of looking for it out of the confusing welter
of Ockhamism, Thomism, Scotism, Aegidianism, and the Mystics l In truth,
it is a futile task. There never was such a unity; and how President Hutch-
ins ever came to suppose there was is not the least of the interesting problems
this book raises. Let it be added in fairness, however, that Dean Clark equally
shares these illusions. Yet whatever our criticisms or our panaceas, we can
all endorse Dean Clark's generous words about President Hutchins-that
he has brought forward issues fundamental to democracy itself and that his
book has "raised the discussion of education from the trivial."
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PRE.SIDENT Hutchins' book contains a diagnosis, definitely prescribed reme-
dies, and a religion to make the remedies palatable. "The most striking fact
about the higher learning in America," President Hutchins finds, "is the
confusion that besets it." There is no "ordering principle ;" it is going off in all
directions at once; it is, in brief, chaos. The causes of this confusion, rooted
deep in the state of the nation, are many and interrelated. First is the vulgar
love of money. This makes educational policy whatever anybody-student,
donor, or legislator-is willing to pay to make it. Next, and more important,
is a misconception of democracy. This leads to two erroneous notions: that
"everybody is entitled to the same amount and the same kind of education"
and that every citizen, editor, alumnus, or trustee can qualify as an educa-
tional expert. A final major cause is our modem idea of progress. Im-
pressed by expansion of our scientific knowledge and improvement in our
technology, we have renounced our intellectual heritage, broken completely
with the past, and ended "with an anti-intellectualism which denies, in effect,
that a man is a rational animal." So much dependence of the higher learn-
ing upon external conditions-the diagnosis continues-afflicts us with a
strange circularity. "The state of the nation depends on the state of educa-
tion; but the state of education depends on the state of the nation." Witness
the three bewildering dilemmas of professionalism, isolation, and anti-intel-
lectualism. The only excuse a university can have for existence is to pro-
vide a haven where truth may be pursued for its own sake; yet public opinion
demands a vocationalism that stops at no triviality. Cooperation is badly
needed between teachers concerned with different trades and teachers pur-
suing truth; yet there is no common frame of reference; cooperation might
even increase the confusion. The ptublic and the professions are anti-intel-
lectual in temper: yet somehow people must be forced to accept intellectual
training. How are these dilemmas and all this confusion to be resolved?
The remedies proposed by President Hutchins are drastic. He demands
an evangelistic movement to remake both general education and the higher
learning. His general education would begin with the junior year in high
school and end with the sophomore year in college. From it he would exclude
body building, character building, the social graces, and tricks of trades.
For these he would substitute a curriculum of "a deeper, wider utility;" it
would seek "the good for which all other goods are only means," the culti-
vation of the intellectual virtues. The truth is everywhere and at all times
the same. An intellect properly disciplined can operate equally well in all
fields. Hence the center of his new curriculum must be "the classics," books
contemporary in any age. "permanent studies" that draw out the elements
of our common nature and link man to the best thought of the past. For
an understanding of such studies, Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, and Mathe-
matics-as the ancients knew them-become indispensable and must be
taught. Technology is not to be excluded but would find a place only to the
extent necessary for the communication of principles. Without such a gen-
eral education, the author insists, we can never get a university. Upon its
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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basic core of common knowledge and cultivation of the intellectual virtues
we might be able to erect a more intelligible higher learning.
In President Hutchins' higher learning remedies and religion become
hopelessly intertangled. "All that can be learned in a university," he states,
"is the general principles, the fundamental propositions, the theory of any
discipline." Students must, and can, be taught to think about fundamental
problems. Three categories exhaust "the proper subject matter" for higher
learning-metaphysics, the social sciences, and natural science. By natural
science the author means "the study of nature ;" he would include enough
recent observations to illustrate principles. His social sciences embrace eth-
ics, politics, economics, and "such historical and empirical materials as may
be needed" to aid in the "guidance of human action." But the gathering of
data, important as it is, has no place in his university proper; such work
must, if we are to avoid confusion, be carried on by institutes, separate from,
though established near and controlled by, the university. What function
metaphysics? It is to pervade the whole. The "common aim of all parts" of
the university, its "unifying principle," is, as indicated above, to be the pur-
suit of truth for truth's own sake. Yet such pursuit alone cannot insure
unity. Some basic, ordering, proportioning discipline, some "science of first
principles," must direct our activities. "Real unity," the author urges, "can
be achieved only by a hierarchy of truths which show us which are funda-
mental and which subsidiary, which significant and which not." In medieval
times this hierarchy was established by theology; but today we are a faith-
less generation, taking no stock in revealed truth. It is futile for us to look
to theology. We can only turn, as did the Greeks, to metaphysics. "It is in
the light of metaphysics that the social sciences, dealing with man and man,
and the physical sciences dealing with man and nature, take shape and illu-
minate one another. In metaphysics we are seeking the causes of things
that are. It is the highest science, the first science, and as first, universal.
It considers being as being, both what it is and the attributes which belong
to it as being." To get a unified university we moderns must, then, "revital-
ize metaphysics and restore it to its place in the higher learning." This
achieved, we might even be able to change the character of our civilization
and, ultimately, to establish rational order in the modern world. Yet for the
accomplishment of these miracles no "specific"--only the "most rational"-
metaphysical system is indispensable.
What is to happen to our professional schools? As such-that is, as "trade"
schools-delendae sunt. In his reformed higher learning President Hutchins
escapes the dilemma of vocationalism; he makes no distinction between pro-
fessional and non-professional disciplines. For the "gestures of varying
degrees of wildness" now made by those attempting to teach the professions
he would substitute study under his three major faculties of metaphysics,
the social sciences, and natural science. Technical institutes can be estab-
lished in connection with the university to supply any required background
of special knowledge and training in special techniques. Today the pros-
pective lawyer, for example, is diverted by attempts to teach him the art of
practice from what he might possibly learn in law school-"the theory, the
fundamental propositions, the general principles of the law." The curriculum
he studies "is confined to those subjects which experience, tradition, or the
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state examinations have sanctified." He is taught, in brief, by the cook-book
method. Yet, paradoxically, he might be better prepared even for practice
if he were trained to think in the subject matter of his discipline; "a grasp
of theory might enable him to meet practical situations which were over-
looked or not foreseen by his instructors." Hence, in the new higher learn-
ing the prospective lawyer will take his metaphysics along with the pros-
pective clergyman or doctor. This is to prepare him to master the subject
that must be central in his new curriculum: jurisprudence. Without meta-
physics, "ethics, politics, and economics are meaningless ;" and jurisprudence
"consists of ethics and politics and the philosophy of law based on them."
Yet jurisprudence is not to be the whole of legal study. To it must be added
"empirical and historical knowledge of society, the history of law and legal
institutions, economics and economic history." The tricks of his trade the
law student can learn in one of the attached institutes.
Critics have found much mystery in this book. The key is, I think, the
author's high idealism. His heroic purpose is to free universities from
the pressure groups that now dominate them and so, eventually, to free us
all, teachers and taught, from all kinds of contemporary dogmas. Yet he
cannot ignore, he would even take advantage of, the commonplace truth that
man must have a faith. "We are," he says, "as a matter of fact, living by the
haphazard, accidental, shifting shreds of a theology and metaphysics to which
we cling because we must cling to something." Let us, then, recognize our
need and get the most rational faith we can. Today the whole world needs,
as never before, a symbol that "represents an abiding faith in the highest
powers of mankind." Temporarily, too--I am interpolating here-we must
persuade the common man that the whole business of education is so occult
that he cannot hope to understand it; patients must be rendered unconscious
before major surgery. For the achievement of these paradoxical aims meta-
physics would appear, on first glance at least, to have been designed by
nature. To begin with, it can be described as the logic of logics, the super-
instrument whereby man's reason can be screwed up to the nth degree of
performance. What base for faith could be more "rational?" Better still,
after several hundred years of controversy nobody knows what metaphysics
is. What could be more occult? A skeptic can always be confounded by the
suggestion that he is, without knowing it, some particularly vicious kind of
metaphysician. The logical implications of our only language and the fact
that we must all, in our ignorance of the "universe." rely on some kind of
faith, make "proof" easy.1 Furthermore, under the label of metaphysics
faculty and students can be forced to a more critical study of all of man's
verbalizing and symbolizing activities. Such study, by sharpening our con-
ceptual tools and pointing to new problems, might even aid empirical dis-
covery; certainly it could be made to dramatize the limitations of arm-chair
speculation. Can there be any wonder-in the light of all these aims-that
the author must write with such studied ambiguity? Yet I think, as numer-
1. The author (p. 103, n. 5) cites a dilemma from Aristotle: "You say one must
philosophize. Then you must philosophize. You say one must not philosophize. Then
(to prove your contention) you must philosophize. In any case you must philoso-
phize." From this quotation I gather that the author equates philosophy and metaphy-
sics, and both with any kind of verbalizing.
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ous other critics have thought, that there are dangers in over-emphasis ol this
timeless, denatured religion President Hutchins is urging to make his reme-
dies palatable.
The obvious danger is that credulous converts may assume that meta-
physics is not merely a religion but some esoteric instrument of discovery, in-
dependent of and in competition with scientific method. President Hutchins
does, as has been seen, use the ancient words over which philosophers have
fought for so long. Even teachers may be inclined to take his words liter-
ally; the glee that greeted his first supposed desertion from the ranks of the
"realists" is well known. Logic offers no way to refute a mystic; one can,
however, ask for more details of the vision. Perhaps, because of the author's
ambiguities, a reviewer may be granted a few ancient questions. How can
general principles, fundamental propositions, and theory be divorced from
practical problems ? What is this truth that is everywhere and at all times
the same? Just-what peculiar technique for its discovery does metaphysics
offer? How does metaphysics ferret out the "causes of things that are,"
"being as being," and the "attributes of being?" If the propositions of this.
"first," "highest," and "universal" science partake of the tautology of logic,
how does the metaphysician hope-without the aid of the empiricist-to
increase man's control over his environment? If its propositions are not
tautologies but tentative hypotheses about the physical world, how is the
metaphysician different from, what are his advantages over, the empiricist?
What other kinds of propositions, if any, are there? What their source,
their test, their function? How, in detail, does metaphysics establish and
maintain its vaunted hierarchy? What kind of unity does it produce? Does
this "unity" have any consequences other than verbal? Why is "unity" a
more practicable or desirable ideal than "diversity"? Why should scholars
forsake their scientific tools to worship at the shrine of one of two polar
words? For President Hutchins, of course, these questions are as irrelevant
as they are rhetorical. He states specifically that "thinking cannot proceed
divorced from facts and from experience ;" and throughout his general edu-
cation and his higher learning, as the summaries above should indicate, he
saves room for enough facts to "illustrate" principles. In fact, the meta-
physics he advocates-no "specific," only "the most rational" system-could
even be expanded, as one of his recent defenders has insisted, to take in the
most anti-metaphysical of philosophies. "Opponents of metaphysics," this
defender writes, "attack as metaphysics precisely what Mr. Hutchins means
by a lack of metaphysics."
2
A second danger is that metaphysics can be, and often is, made to serve
the purposes not of a liberating but of an enslaving faith. "To be grandly
vague," a critic of fascism writes, "is the shortest route to power; for a
meaningless noise is that which divides us least."3 Dean Clark has pointed
to the striking similarities in the language of President Hutchins and that
2. McKeon, Education and the Disciplines (1937) 47 INT. J. ETHICS 370, 378. Em-
pirical confirmation of this can be found in the fact that the title page of Professor
Carnap's latest book bears the inscription "Professor of Philosophy in the University
of Chicago." CARNAP, THE LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE (1937).
3. Herman Finer, quoted in SMITH, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1936)
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of the German minister of education. 4 Unity alone is a symbol too barren
to attract followers; metaphysics, if not an instrument of discovery, cannot
create new social ideals; the rational sciences of politics and ethics have
never produced anything but commonplace talk about "individual happiness,"
"the good life," and "the common good." Certainly it wuuld appear that
metaphysics, if it is to have any effect in determining human behavior,
must be made to implement some social ideal taken from without its own
great arabesque of words. But what is to determine this choice of an ideal
from without? What is to confine it to "liberal" ideals? The fact is, as we
all know, that each of the multitudinous and conflicting "isms" today clam-
oring for our loyalty seeks, and often obtains, sanctification in its own
peculiar brand of metaphysics. What we have is a chaos of both "isms" and
metaphysical systems. Which metaphysics is the most "rational"? How does
President Hutchins propose to quell all this confusion and accomplish his
major purpose of liberating us from all kinds of nostrums, dogmas, and
"isms"? In terms all he offers is educational authoritarianism. "In the cur-
rent use of freedom," he writes, "it is an end in itself. But it must be clear
that if each person has the right to make and achieve his own choices the
result is anarchy and the dissolution of the whole."5 This is strange doctrine
from a liberal; it sounds much like the dictatorial dogma that no man but
one has a "right" to his own opinion; obviously it can be made to serve any
end. Yet, again, if the author's metaphysics is comprehensive enough, as
his arch defender alleges, to take in the most anti-metaphysical of our mod-
em philosophies, there might be profit in its study. It could be made a meta-
physics to end metaphysics, a faith to end faiths. "First principles," Pro-
fessor McKeon writes,6 "are frequently accepted by habit and inertia, or by
whim and emotional preference, or by authority, whether of church or acad-
emy or class." What President Hutchins advocates is "careful, laborious
examination of first principles with all the devices that reason or the assem-
bled experience of mankind can effect." 7 Such a study would undoubtedly
end in a frank confession of our ignorance of man and his universe and a
resolute determination to reduce that ignorance by scientific methods (not
omitting theory).
A final "imaginary horrible" brings us back to legal education. Too much
emphasis on jurisprudence could return legal scholars to the sterile dialectics
of an earlier day. What are these fundamental propositions and general
principles that can be taught apart from "practice" and yet enable the stu-
4. Clark, The Higher Learning in a Democracy (1937) 47 I::T. J. ETrHcS 317, 319.
5. Contrast the eloquent answer of Dean Clark, supra note 4, at 324: "In the
very words of the criticism leveled against present university education, it is both anti-
intellectual and vocational. It is anti-intellectual in that the scholar must conform not
to the demands which his own mind makes of him but to that metaphysics, that view
of the good life, which the university authorities set before him. It is vocational not
in any narrow sense of instructing in skills to be used next week or next year but in
the sense of training merely to get by, in conformity to set standards, with adventure
into unknown or unrationalized fields of knowledge taboo. These dangers, even if
merely potential, are too important to be lightly dismissed."
6. McKeon, loc. cit. supra note 2.
7. Ibid.
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dent "to think in the subject matter" of his discipline, to "meet practical
situations" not foreseen by his instructors? Speculative jurists have sought
them without success for over two thousand years. "Jurisprudence," a great
English authority on Roman law has written,8 "has no independent existence.
Its formulae are meaningless except in relation to concrete rules. It is a
part of the law." Even when removed from the transcendental and confined
to practical problems, jurisprudence-at least as exemplified in England and
America for the last century-is largely a monument to the folly of attempt-
ing to overpower "truth" by the formal analysis of circular legal doctrine.
Learned scholar after learned scholar has wasted his energies manipulating
rights, powers, privileges, immunities, liberties, duties, disabilities, liabilities,
and no rights, and composite concepts like ownership, possession, title, lien,
estate, entity and so forth, as if some manipulation of these concepts could,
and should, control the behavior of judges.0 These efforts have not been
wholly without effect; they have fortified tradition, have provided a com-
fortable faith in a government of laws and not of men, and have driven
weak or timid judges, because of the supposed inelasticity of the concepts,
to harsh decisions in particular cases; but they have done little to shed light
on the actual operation of our legal system or to give it new direction. Such
jurisprudence is, in the words of Thurman Arnold, "the shining but un-
fulfilled dream of a world governed by reason." 10 This ancient, impotent
jurisprudence is not, of course, the kind that President Hutchins is advocat-
ing. He demands a new and practicable jurisprudence; he would liberate
us from conventional legal absolutism. This new jurisprudence is to be, he
elaborates in a recent article,"' an "ordered relation" of three studies, "the
study of cases," "the study of how law operates in fact," and "the study of
legal philosophy." The study of how law operates in fact takes in the "eco-
nomical, social, and political" bases and effects of decisions; the study of
legal philosophy takes in psychology as well as the rational sciences of ethics
and politics. Just how jurisprudence is to supply this "ordered relation" or
how it is to be supplied to jurisprudence is not made clear; but the important
point is that in his positive program he simply reaffirms the "faith" of our
legal "realists." What he is after is, again, a broadening of horizons-a juris-
prudence to show the limitations of jurisprudence. "No law professor can
claim to be one," he now writes,' 2 "if he separates himself altogether from
the 'realistic' movement." His own contribution to the movement is, I think,
an incomprehensible verbal "screen" behind which the "realists" may be
able, if they are astute, to put their aspirations into practice. He has taken
the advice of the "neo-realists" to capture the weapons of the enemy and
8. Buckland, The Difficldties of Abstract Jurisprudence (1890) 6 L. Q. REV. 436,
438.
9. I do not belittle the destructive power of the Hohfeld system or the critical
labors of the scholars who have used that system to shave down "fundamental" con-
cepts and generalizations.
10. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) 58.
11. Hutchins, Legal Education (1937) 4 UNIv. OF Cnl. L. REv. 357, 368.
12. Id. at 362.
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attack in the name of what you would reform.1 3 Whether the dangers in his
ambiguities are real remains to be seen; Barnum might even come to believe
in his own show.
THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH*LAw. By R. M. Jackson.'
Cambridge: The University Press, 1936. Pp. -xxi, 134. $3.75.
IN the preface to his Tagore Law Lectures Dr. Winfield recalled the
temptation to which he had been put to devote them completely to the sub-
ject of quasi-contract, and though unfortunately he did not yield to this
half-formed intention, students were grateful for the searching examination
of the various causes of action said to be quasi ex contraclti which he did
provide in a chapter of that volume. A chapter did not permit him to deal
adequately with the beginnings and the development of quasi-contractual
relief, and it is to these that Mr. Jackson in the present volume has turned
his attention. Though the subject has been dealt with in parts by Langdell,
Ames, Street, and Sir William Holdsworth, there is available no detailed
historical account of quasi-contract in English law, a deficiency which goes
far to explain the difficulties modern lawyers and judges have found in
explaining these obligations and in assigning them a proper place in an
assumed precise dichotomy of tort and contract. The unfortunate Sinclair
v. Brougham2 is in large measure responsible both for the renewed interest
in the study of quasi-contractual obligations in England and for the present
day tendency to define quasi-contract in terms which exclude any reference
to a basis in contract, whether "fictional," "implied in law," or "construc-
tive," and proponents of this view have buttressed their argument by an
appeal to history in the person of Lord Mansfield. Thus Dr. Winfield has
pointed out that Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macfcrlan3 altered the basis
of the action for money had and received by introducing a theory of aequum
et bonim to replace the theory of a contract implied in law.4 Dr. Hanbury
has likewise noticed that Lord Mansfield introduced notions of an equitable
character which gave the commonplace quasi-contractual obligation the ap-
pearance of an equitable institution enforced by common law remedies.5
And Mr. Fifoot, in a very recent book, regards Sinclair v. Broughamn as sub-
stituting at the basis of quasi-contract Lord Sumner's fictitious contract for
Lord Mansfield's unjust enrichment.0 These views Mr. Jackson finds doubt-
ful. Behind Lord 'Mansfield's oratorical flourishes he finds no abandonment
13. Hamilton, Book Review (1936) 142 NATio. 51, 52 [review of Aniora , Tim
Sym0IBLS OF GOVE.RNImENT (1935)].
1. Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge.
2. [1914] A. C. 398.
3. 2 Burr. 1005 (1760).
4. T E PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF TORt (1931) 127, 134.
5. MoDRmN EQurry (1935) 93.
6. LoRD MANSFIELD (1936) 247-48.
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of the accepted rules. The decision in Sinclair v. Brougham he regards
therefore as the logical outcome of principles accepted for almost three cen-
turies, and thus, though he regrets that the court followed the law instead
of inventing a more sensible rule, he finds Lord Mansfield's prop wrongly
placed beneath the superstructure. In this he is perhaps not wholly con-
vincing, and whether Lord Mansfield intended to attach the action for money
had and received indissolubly to the idea of agreement remains an open
question. Certainly Mr. Jackson's distinction between aequum et bonum as
the material but not the formal source of the obligation would have met
with something less than the whole-hearted approval of that intellectual but
unacademic gentleman.
Quasi-contracts form a sorte de nionstre lgendaire, and in both Roman
and English law they defy reduction to principle. The courts of common
law in the mediaeval and early modern period developed in their own empiri-
cal way the law in respect to various miscellaneous obligations which came
to be known, in later times, as quasi-contracts. Development within the
limits of actions begun by original writ was difficult, and prior to the rise
of indebitatus assumpsit the law of quasi-concract seems to have been but
rudimentary, but Mr. Jackson has indicated quite fully some quasi-contrac-
tual aspects of the action of account and the use of debt to enforce
obligations essentially quasi-contracts. Fortunately in this first part of
his volume Mr. Jackson was unable to avoid a study of the nature and
scope of these actions, for the subject-matter is implicated with procedure
and much confused by it. Both actions receive careful attention: we may
single out for notice here his admirable criticism of Langdell's theory of
account and his investigation into the relation between debt and account and
the reasons for the virtual disappearance of the latter as a common law
action. The second half of the volume is devoted to quasi-contracts from the
late seventeenth century onwards, when the action of indebitatus assumpsit,
developing as a remedy in contract, was extended to include quasi-contracts
as well. We may trace its progress from the grudging permission to extend
the action given by Holt to its complete establishment as a popular remedy
by Lord Mansfield. Since Mr. Jackson presents the subject under headings
which emphasize the character of the several species of quasi-contractual
obligation rather than the procedural remedies that enforce them, this second
section likewise takes him far afield and new light is thrown upon many
questions of adjective law especially troublesome to those who have occasion
to consult the refractory seventeenth century reports. The volume closes
with several sections upon the theoretical basis of the action, but in view
of Mr. Jackson's forthcoming supplementary volume on the modern law of
quasi-contract, discussion directed toward these sections is premature and
must be postponed until his more complete treatment is made available.
The volume provides a background for Dr. Winfield's survey of the exist-
ing English law, though it is clear from what I have said that the author's
,disclosure of the principal historical foundations upon which the present law
has been built does not support it unaltered or in every particular. Mr.
Jackson's volume will fill a prominent place in the series of Yorke Prize
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Essays to which it is the latest addition. Mention must be made of Professor
Hazeltine's characteristic editorial preface which has become usual in this
series of Cambridge studies and to which readers have become accustomed
to turn with much profit.
S. E. THox-*f
Chicago, Ill.
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWs. By George Wilfred Stumberg.1 Chi-
cago: The Foundation Press, 1937. Pp. xl, 441. $5.00
STUDENTS desiring an excellent notebook on the Conflict of Laws could
scarcely wish for anything superior to Stumberg's Principles. The book
follows substantially the arrangement of the more commonly used casebooks.
It states the basic principles, rules or points of view in black-letter text,
which is followed by explanations and a critical discussion of the leading
cases contained in the casebooks. Iatters of lesser importance are relegated
to footnotes, which are not overburdened with citation of cases but are full
of interesting materials and form an important complement to the text.
The average student will find in the text everything he deems necessary
for his requirements; the more ambitious student can, through the footnotes,
get a more comprehensive grasp of the subject. From teachers, also, Stum-
berg's book should receive a most hearty welcome. The materials dealt
with in a course of the Conflict of Laws are so extensive that within the
time usually allotted only the most elementary aspects of the subject can be
considered. The teacher can now refer the student to this book as a source
of general information, and concentrate in class on the more difficult prob-
lems. Both student and teacher owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Stum-
berg for so excellent a guide, written in such a clear and attractive style.
The author takes a realistic approach to the subject. He does not take
all life out of it by an attempt to reduce everything to logical rules. When
there is conflict he frankly says so, states the pros and cons, and generally
expresses his personal opinion on the point in question. The student sees
the Conflict of Laws as it actually is, with all its attractiveness and imper-
fection. The book is thus a wholesome antidote to the Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws.
Professor Stumberg does not confine his discussion to the decisions of
Anglo-American courts, but takes in also the legal literature in general and
the Restatement. In preparing an elementary treatise, he could not, of course,
go very deeply or fully into the periodical literature, but he has done so as
far as the limits of space permitted. He refers to the Restatement through-
out, calling special attention to it whenever its provisions give rise to doubt
or call for criticism. All in all, the student gets a wider perspective of the
1 Assistant Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Northwestern University.
1. Professor of Law, University of Te-xas School of Law.
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subject than is afforded by any other existing American treatise. The author
reveals an open-mindedness and soundness of judgment deserving the highest
praise.
Professor Stumberg's general point of view is shared so fully by the re-
viewer that it seems unnecessary to consider this aspect of the work. To
single out minor differences of opinion would be unprofitable.
ERNEST G. LORENZENt
New Haven, Conn.
THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF THE TARIFF. By John Day Larkin. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press,1 1936. Pp. xii, 207. $2.00.
FOR THOSE who think the Supreme Court's doctrines regarding the dele-
gation of legislative power are anything more than verbiage to cloak the
results of "undisclosed major premises," this small volume is recommended
reading. Against an analysis of Chief Justice Taft's opinion in the Hampton
case,2 it examines the administrative provisions of the tariff acts, those of
1922 and 1930 especially. Delegation is piled upon delegation - power to
control the Tariff Commission, to alter statutory rates, to change classifi-
cations, to revalue imports, to add duties to prevent dumping or to offset
foreign currency devaluation - up to the climax in the reciprocal trade act
of 1934, which delegated power to bargain away any of the previous dele-
gations. Almost complete legal authority is vested in the President to annihi-
late or to stimulate foreign trade as he wishes, and with the Court's full
consent. The fiction of a Congressional standard to be applied is exposed by
considering the inner inconsistencies of "cost-equalization." It is an instruc-
tive case history -in delegation.
In other respects the book falls short. It wants perspective. Why the degree
of delegation? The author does not get at one of the major premises of the
Hampton case, namely, that nothing the President is likely to do in adjusting
tariffs could be worse than the way Congress does it.3 And the grasp of con-
stitutional law is not always sure. Dr. Larkin argues, for example, that there
is and should be no judicial review of tariff adjustments under the "flexible"
provisions-which may readily be granted. But he labors the point unnec-
cessarily because he insists upon regarding a tariff as an exertion of the
taxing power solely. That it is a regulation of foreign commerce is a sug-
' Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale School of Law
1. But the proofreading is measureably below Harvard standards.
2. 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
3. Fortunately, this job has been thoroughly done in a book too recent to be in-
cluded in the author's bibliography: SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE
TARIFF (1936), a study of the process by which the Smoot-Hawley tariff was drafted
and passed.
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gestion he makes only to dismiss it cavalierly;4 yet it would at once have




THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TrBUNALS, Supplement to
the 1926 Revised Edition. By Jackson H. Ralston.1 Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1936. Pp. xx, 231. $4.00.
As GOVERNMENTS began to be more willing to publish the records of the
settlements of international claims, the Anglo-American system of case-
method collection has been turned with increasing frequency to the collection,
arrangement and critical analysis of cases of international law interest. Since
the publication of Mr. Ralston's The Law and Procedure of International
Tribunals in 1926, international lawyers have added to their arsenal of pri-
mary sources, among others, such series as the Anual Digest2 and the Fontes
juris gentium,3 Series A, which in section 1 deals with the decisions of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and in section 2 with the decisions
of the German Supreme Court involving international law. While there is
some overlapping of material, the method and design of these three source
books are so different that a library's inclusion of one should not indicate
the exclusion of the other. Mr. Ralston has digested in brief form the find-
ings of international tribunals on a wide range of international problems. He
has restricted his material to cases of purely international interest. Following
roughly the same patterns of arrangement, the Annual Digest has included,
in addition, decisions of national courts involving questions of international
interest. None of the three indulge in expansive critical comment.
In the Supplement, in which he brings his 1926 volume "as nearly up to
date as may be," Mr. Ralston employs the technique which he used in the
1926 edition. At certain points he makes explicit cross references to sections
4. P. 113. The fact that the Court ignored this ground in the Hampton decision
surely means only that since it was prepared to sustain both the delegation and the tax
it did not need to find additional support for the act. See 2 WVILourB,, TnE CO:;sTr-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 690; Cushman, Social ard Economic
Control Through Fcderal Taxation (1934) 13 Mmx. L REv. 759, 767; Board of
Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 (1933); cf. Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (U. S. 1869).
tAssistant Professor of Government, Yale University.
1. Author, INTERNATIONAL AaarrAR. LAW AND PRocEDUan (1909); Dm. clcCY's
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922); INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATiON (1929).
2. Published by the Department of International Studies of the London School of
Economics.
3. Viktor Bruns, editor, director of Institfit fuir ausldndishes rffentliches Recht
und V6lkerrecht, Berlin.
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in the main volume. These factors make for ease in using the two books
together.
In spite of the well-balanced use of quotations, often the brevity of Mr.
Ralston's statement of a case seems barren and makes the summary system
of the Annual Digest seem more attractive. However, the great scope of ma-
terial which Mr. Ralston covers in the two volumes and the ease with which
they may be used, more than compensates for any passing desire for more
expansive treatment.
Although well qualified to do so, Mr. Ralston seldom surrenders and makes
critical comments upon individual cases or upon groups of cases. Occasion-
ally he does so, as in the Clipperton Island dispute between France and
Mexico 4 and the discussion of the rules on denial of justice.5 These com-
ments, made by a lawyer experienced in international affairs, are deeply
thought-provoking, and are but further evidence of the wealth of experience




5. P. 42 et seq.
tResearch Assistant, Yale Law School.
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